Name and Link	Type of Resource	Description

Hyman Minsky (1987), Securitization Preface and Afterword by L. Randall Wray Levy Economics Institute, Policy Note 2008/2 Available here	Article	"“At the annual banking structure and competition conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in May 1987, the buzzword heard in the corridors and used by many of the speakers was ‘that which can be securitized, will be securitized.’” So notes Hyman Minsky in a prescient memo on the nature, and the implications, of securitization, written 20 years before an explosion in the securitization of home mortgages helped create the current financial crisis. This memo, which served as the basis for a lecture in Minsky’s monetary theory class at Washington University, has not been widely circulated. It is published here in its entirety, with a preface and an afterword by Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray that places Minsky’s work in context. "
Hyman P. Minsky The Financial Instability Hypothesis, Levy Economics Institute WP 74 May 1992 Available Here	Seminal Article much cited in analysis of the Sub-Prime Financial Crisis	""
Simon Wilson "Hyman Minsky: Why Is The Economist Suddenly Popular?" The Daily Reckoning Fri 13 Apr, 2007 Available Here	Online newsletter article	"If economist Hyman Minsky is right, then our economy is like a giant Ponzi scheme, and the rush for the exits is due to start. Is he right? Simon Wilson reports - Why is Minsky suddenly popular?"
L. Randall Wray Financial Markets Meltdown. What Can We Learn from Minsky? Levy Economics Institute, Public Policy Brief April 2008 Available Here	Article	"Randall Wray explains today’s complex and fragile financial system, and how the seeds of crisis were sown by lax oversight, deregulation, and risky innovations such as securitization. He estimates that the combined losses throughout the entire financial sector could amount to several trillion dollars, and that the United States will feel the effects of the crisis for some time—perhaps a decade or more. Wray recommends enhanced oversight of financial institutions, much larger stimulus packages, and creation of a new institution in line with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Home Owners’ Loan Corporation."
Paul Davidson Securitization, Liquidity and Market Failure Challenge Magazine May/June 2008 Available Here	Article	Extract "Initially the United States subprime mortgage problem created an insolvency problem for major underwriters as the exotic financial instruments that they created as mortgage backed assets lost liquidity and market value. This problem has proved contagious as it has started to spill over to other markets such as the auction-rate securities market and the credit default swap markets that are failing. The auction rate markets, which had seen few failures in recent years, suddenly experienced over a thousand failures in the early months of 2008. What has caused this contagion to spill over and cause this tremendous increase in market failures? The answer is simple. This problem has developed as economists and market participants have forgotten Keynes’s liquidity preference theory [hereafter LPT] and have, instead swallowed hook, line, and sinker the belief that the classical efficient market theory [hereafter EMT] is a useful model for understanding the operation of real world financial markets......"
Paul Davidson Is the current financial distress caused by the subprime mortgage crisis a Minsky moment? or is it the result of attempting to securitize illiquid noncommercial mortgage loans?, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, July 2008 Available Here	Article	"Does Minsky's theory explain recent market instability? For financial fragility, Minsky argued, specific preconditions must occur. These preconditions have not occurred, therefore recent financial market instability is not a Minsky moment. Instead the recent financial market instability is due to an insolvency problem of large underwriters caused by their attempt to "securitize" (make liquid) noncommercial mortgages (where the latter are normally illiquid assets). The solution for such an insolvency problem is large direct infusions of new capital in these institutions or removing nonperforming loans from their books. An easy money policy per se will not do."
Paul Davidson Health warning for a computer age Asia Times Online Nov 2008 Available Here	Article	"The winter of 2007-2008 will prove to be one of discontent and the beginning of the end in the classical theory of the efficiency of global financial markets. For more than three decades, mainstream economists had preached, and politicians had swallowed, the myth of the efficiency of such free markets. Those who do not study the lessons of history are bound to repeat its errors. Economists forgot the events of the Great Depression and the collapse of unfettered financial markets that followed the "Roaring Twenties" prosperity. For history has repeated itself with the growth of deregulated markets and the prosperity of the 1990s ending up in 2008 with the greatest recession since the Great Depression …….."
Fernandez, Luisa, Kaboub, Fadhel & Todorova, Zdravka On Democratizing Financial Turmoil:A Minskian Analysis of the Subprime Crisis. Levy Economics Institute WP 548 Nov 2008 Available Here	Article	ABSTRACT "This paper uses Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis as an analytical framework for understanding the subprime mortgage crisis and for introducing adequate reforms to restore economic stability. We argue that the subprime crisis has structural origins that extend far beyond the housing and financial markets. We further argue that rising inequality since the 1980s formed the breeding ground for the current financial markets meltdown. What we observe today is only the manifestation of the ingenuity of the market in taking advantage of moneymaking opportunities, regardless of the consequences. The so-called “democratization of homeownership” rapidly turned into record-high delinquencies and foreclosures. The sudden turn in market expectations led investors and banks to reevaluate their portfolios, which brought about a credit crunch and widespread economic instability. The Federal Reserve Bank’s intervention came too late and failed to usher in adequate regulation. Finally, the paper argues that a true democratization of homeownership is only possible through job creation and incomegeneration programs, rather than through exotic mortgage schemes. "
Wynne Godley, Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Gennaro Zezza Prospects for the United States and the World: A Crisis That Conventional Remedies Cannot Resolve Levy Economics Institute.Strategic Analysis December 2008 Available Here as well as link to previous years' Strategic Analysis reports, cited in the text.	Article	"The prospects for the U.S. economy have become uniquely dreadful, if not frightening. In this paper we argue, as starkly as we can, that the United States and the rest of the world’s economies will not be able to achieve balanced growth and full employment unless they are able to agree upon and implement an entirely new way of running the global economy.......During the last 10 years, the Levy Institute has published a series of Strategic Analyses, of which the original object was, not to make short-term forecasts, but to set forth a range of scenarios that displayed, over a period of five to 15 years, the likely obstacles to growth with full employment. In the first of these papers, published in 1999, at a time when there was an emphatic consensus that “the good times were here to stay,” we took the contrarian view—well ahead of the curve—that unsustainable imbalances were building up that would eventually require both a large fiscal stimulus and a sustained rise in net exports, preferably via a substantial depreciation of the dollar."
James Crotty and Gerald Epstein Avoiding Another Meltdown Challenge Magazine, January-February, 2009, pp. 5 – 26. Available here Also see their synopsis here	Article	"The authors argue that the current financial crisis, the worst since the Great Depression, can be seen as the latest phase in the evolution of fi nancial markets under a radical fi nancial deregulation process that began in the late 1970s. Deregulation accompanied by rapid fi nancial innovation stimulated powerful booms that ended in crises. But governments responded to the crises with new bailouts that allowed new expansions to begin. As a result, financial markets have become ever larger, and the crises have become more threatening to society, which forces governments to enact ever larger bailouts. The authors provide a comprehensive set of regulatory solutions they believe will sharply reduce financial instability. "
James K. Galbraith & Daniel Munevar Sastre The Generalized Minsky Moment University of Texas Inequality Project Working Paper No. 56 February 2, 2009 Available Here	Article	Abstract"The cornerstone of Hyman Minsky’s work is the concept of systemic instability. His work showed how systemic dynamics inherent to capitalism bread systemic fragility and crisis, as stability spurs risky behavior. Like Minsky himself succinctly articulated, “stability is destabilizing” (Minsky 1985). Moreover, this key notion is not only based on a clear and detailed analysis of modern financial capitalism, but is also essentially rooted on human psychology and behavior. As such, it is astonishing how little has been done to expand Minsky’s basic conceptual framework to other fields of study of social science. This paper represents an effort to fill this vacuum, as it attempts to expand Minsky’s theory of financial fragility to the realm of international relations. The objective of this project is to analyze the cycles of international relations in the light of a modified version of Minsky’s famous analysis of hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance. "
Randall Wray The Return of Big Government, Policy Advice for President Obama. Levy Economics Institute. Public Policy Brief No. 99 March 2009 Available here	Article	Extract "In the current global financial crisis, economists and policymakers have reembraced Big Government as a means of preventing the reoccurrence of a debt-deflation depression. According to Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray, the danger is that policy may not downsize finance and replace money manager capitalism. Moreover, we need a permanently larger fiscal presence, with more public services. His advice to President Obama is to discard all of former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson’s actions. Wray believes that we can afford any necessary spending and bailouts, and that these actions will not burden our grandchildren."
Jan Kregel It’s That “Vision” Thing: Why the Bailouts Aren’t Working, and Why a New Financial System Is Needed Levy Economics Institute. Public Policy Brief No. 100, April 2009 Available Here	Article	"The Federal Reserve’s response to the current financial crisis has been praised because it introduced a zero interest rate policy more rapidly than the Bank of Japan (during the Japanese crisis of the 1990s) and embraced massive “quantitative easing.” However, despite vast capital injections, the banking system is not lending in support of the private sector. Senior Scholar Jan Kregel compares the current situation with the Great Depression, and finds an absence of New Deal measures and institutions in the current rescue packages. The lessons of the Great Depression suggest that any successful policy requires fundamental structural reform, an understanding of how the financial system failed, and the introduction of a new financial structure (in a short space of time) that is designed to correct these failures. The current crisis could have been avoided if increased household consumption had been financed through wage increases, says Kregel, and if financial institutions had used their earnings to augment bank capital rather than bonuses. "
James K. Galbraith Why the economic crisis, and its solution, are bigger than you think. Washington Monthly, March/April 2009-04-09 Available Here	Article	""
James K. Galbraith A “People First” Strategy: Credit Cannot Flow When There Are No Creditworthy Borrowers or Profitable Projects Levy Economics Institute, Strategic Analysis, April 2009 Available at this page	Article	"We are in the shadow of a global catastrophe, and we need to come to grips with the crisis—fast. According to Senior Scholar James K. Galbraith, two ingrained habits are leading to our failure to do so. The first is the assumption that economies will eventually return to normal on their own—an overly hopeful view that doesn’t take into account the massive pay-down of household debt resulting from the collapse of the banks. The second bad habit is the belief that recovery runs through the banks rather than around them. But credit cannot flow when there are no creditworthy borrowers or profitable projects; banks have failed, and the failure to recognize this is a recipe for wild speculation and control fraud, compounding taxpayer losses."
Paul Davidson, “Alternative Explanations Of The Operation Of A Capitalist Economy: Efficient Market Theory Vs. Keynes’s Liquidity Theory” Real-World Economics Review, issue no. 50 2009 Available Here	Article	""
Korkut Ertürk and Gökcer Özgür: "What is Minsky all about, anyway?" Real-World Economics Review, issue no. 50 2009 Available Here	Article	""
Victoria Chick Keynes and Policy in the Crisis Prepared for the workshop 'Beyond the Headlines - the Political Economy of the Economic Crisis' at Kingston University, 15 June 2010 Available Here	Conference Paper	Abstract: "Do the policies taken in the UK to alleviate the present crisis represent a return to the economics of Keynes? Well, yes and no. Monetary policy, undertaken agaist a structural evolution of finance that Keynes would have found amazing, conforms to some of Keynes’s policy presciptions, but without the background which would make them effective in Keynes’s terms. Fiscal policy looks more to Keynesian economics than the economics of Keynes. Keynes does provide a starting point from which to argue cogently about bank regulation but is little help in dealing with what I argue is the underlying real crisis. This has been going on since the mid-1960s but is never addressed."